the wealth of instructions, anecdotes, heroic examples, and ["oracular'l pronouncements that express and exemplify Jewish thinking about the ways good or responsible people ought to behave and what sort of life they ought to live. In this case we should easily see not only that there is such a thing as Jewish ethics, but that it is extremely rich and diverse. Limited to such terms, we would be hard pressed to understand why characterization of Judaism as an "ethical monotheism" might be meaningful or why it might be controversial.
Reflecting on the richness of instruction in Jewish sources concerning what people should do and how they ought to behave, Leon Roth lamented that ''Jewish Ethics, or more properly an Ethic of Judaism, does not exist."! Explaining his criticism, Roth made the important theoretical claim that "Ethics is the theory of morals-it is the reflective inquiry into the nature of morals." On the basis of this claim he concluded that "the mussar literature, both medieval and modern, is inadequate. It does not contain a coherent set of ideas knit together by thought-out principles."2 Contrary to the position I develop in this essay, Roth believed in the possibility of Jewish Ethics and demanded of Jewish thinkers fIrst a statement of "the moral ideas of Judaism" and second "the bringing them together into one intelligible and coherent view."3His hopes, I fear, must inevitably be confounded by the nature of halakhic reasoning and the logical opacity of halakhic procedure.
Halakhic discourse may seem ideally suited for ethical analysis. This impression is created by the argumentative style through which talmudic literature seeks reasons and justifIcations for the authoritative pronouncements of its tannaitic sources. 4 The impression may be strengthened by the tendency of halakhists to resist the fInality of legal codes and to embellish writings in codifIcatory style with encyclopedic studies of their probable sources. 5 We must, however, carefully scrutinize halakhic justifIcations to determine whether they reveal the thought process that led a rabbi to a cer- (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992) . Novak strives to overcome objections of the type I outline in this essay by means of a traditional Jewish distinction between scriptural and rabbinic law. He admits that scriptural law resists the quest after ethical principles but claims that rabbinic law does not. Novak accounts for the difference in terms of origins. Being divine and revealed, he maintains, scripture may elude ethical analysis, but rabbinic legislation is a human activity in which we can participate. I cannot see how this theological distinction overcomes my objections. 
